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Paper no. 2589
15-Feb.-2008
PAKISTAN: ELECTIONS - Can it Deliver Peace
By Bhaskar Roy
Pakistan is bracing for the February 18 general elections that is supposed to be “free and fair”, and bring back parliamentary democracy to the nation.
The country has almost been at war with itself. This war is not like the ones being fought in some of the African countries these days. For a more sophisticated country like Pakistan with high intellectual property, commendable military strength, and nuclear arms the situation worries everybody. That the problems do not have any definite contours, adds to the concerns.
What Pervez Musharraf did in the last one year, that is, through 2007, tore to shreds what was otherwise still a vibrant nation, each interest section pursuing its own goal. As concurrently Chief of Army Staff and literally self-appointed President of the country, he lost whatever political balance that was left.
The Western countries led by the USA pinned their hopes purely on the General to deliver to them the Al-Qaeda leadership. The Taliban was of secondary consequence because its Chief, Mullah Omar was not sending terrorists and suicide bombers abroad to attack US and European interests. That the Taliban was fighting the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan and had sheltered Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda operatives, were matters to be dealt with separately.
The West also understood that Musharraf had made certain compromises with the radical elements, but as long as he kept delivering Al-Qaeda leaders at regular intervals, he proved his utility.
The US held its patience since September 11, 2001. But with increasing Al-Qaeda linked terrorist attacks in Europe, with a number of important arrests there, and the terrorist organisation’s unshifting focus on America, Washington saw the need to rearrange the power matrix in Pakistan.
Musharraf sensed early that Washington was planning to clip his wings. He reacted by creating more Islamist extremist problems to make his case for retaining dual power. His strategy, however, backfired. For example, the Lal Masjid conflagration last year which led to the death of several Islamic students and Maulavis in the Mosque, including its leader.
The developments in Pakistan are well known. Musharraf made two major mistakes. He alienated the extreme religious radicals, the tribals in the country’s Northern border areas, and the middle of the road religious parties. Second, by acting against the Chief Justice, Iftehar Ahmed Chaudhury and then dismissing Chaudhury and sixty top judges of the country, he strengthened the suffocated intellectual and liberal pride of Pakistan, the civil society.
Musharraf was allowed by the West to elect himself as a civilian President of Pakistan, but his mainstay, the post of Army Chief, was taken away.
The triangular power sharing formula envisaged by the US was also demolished with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on November 27, last year. This formula envisaged Musharraf as civilian President, Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister, and Gen. Ashfaq Kayani as the Army Chief. Now Musharraf and Kayani are left, and the February 18 polls are expected to throw up the third leg of a three-legged stool, at least in the Bush administration’s strategy.
Musharraf still enjoys support from the US and the West. The election results are not expected to affect him unless the new Parliament decides to impeach him and amend the Constitution. Gen. Kayani is widely reported to be Washington’s chosen man.
There is strong pressure on Musharraf to hold free, fair and peaceful elections. The European Union has warned him against rigging the polls. US officials have openly stated that rigging the elections cannot be ruled out totally. Otherwise, a victory for Musharraf’s party, the PML (Q), through a blatantly flawed election would make US political and military operations difficult in Pakistan.
The elections will be mainly a fight between Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (N) and Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP). The PML (Q), which broke away from the original PML of Nawaz Sharif to join Musharraf is now on a weak wicket. Its acceptance among the people is directly linked to Musharraf’s popularity. And Musharraf’s acceptance is hitting rock bottom according to recent public opinion surveys.
There are problems for the opposition parties. The security situation in the country is such that political parties have hardly been able to campaign. In a recent rally of the PPP a gunshot was reportedly fired. A suicide bomber killed more than 30 people at an Awami National Party (ANP) election rally on February 9 in Charsadda district in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). It is significant that no group has claimed responsibility. Any major extremist group like Beitullah Mehsud’s Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) would have proudly claimed responsibility if it was responsible for such incidents.
In due course Pakistan Interior Ministry may try to fix responsibility for the NWFP incident. NWFP is a volatile region with mostly tribal provinces and it would not be difficult to find some alleged culprit to pin the responsibility on. That there is no claimant for the incident yet raises questions because most of these anti-Musharraf tribal extremist groups are proud, and making a false claim would demean the leaders in the eyes of their followers.
The only institution capable of such acts to maintain the power status quo through security threats is Pakistan’s most dreaded military intelligence agency, the ISI. This agency benefits from the extension of the present power structure in the country through the coming election because the Musharraf led government has become dependent on this institution.
The ISI family has become something of a Mafia Kingdom within the government. Army Chief Gen. Kayani was the ISI Chief before his present appointment. He would have hardly been able to penetrate the “Family” and make the whole institution march to his command. The Family would perform the normal duties ordered by its Director, but if he is not one of their own, he would not be privy to their own operations.
The ISI Family is not necessarily dependent only on the government budget. The US support to the Pakistan Army and the ISI during the Afghan war against the Soviet funded regime of Md. Daud in Kabul taught them how to earn revenue from weapons running and Afghan narcotic smuggling. They also have their people in the armed forces.
The ISI Family raised a number of Islamic terrorist groups including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI), and Sunni extremist tanzim the Laskar-e-Jhangoi (LEJ). Al these groups have trained their own fighters and suicide bombers. Musharraf indulged them, used them, and ultimately became their prisoner.
The Family’s interest lies in preventing a political change. It also has its connection with the Al.Qaeda and the Taliban. Even Baitullah Mehsud was a creation of the ISI. But in this kind of a situation friends and allies need not always see eye to eye. The Family, therefore, is the main suspect responsible for terror threats to control the election powers. According to recent opinion polls in the four provinces in Pakistan conducted by a reputable American institution it was found that Musharraf’s popularity had dipped to 15 percent. The most popular was late Benazir’s PPP with 36.7 percent, followed by Nawaz Sharif’s PML (N) supported by 25.3 percent. The PML (Q) slumped to 12 percent popularity. The support for the Islamic parties had sharply dropped.
In a free and fair election the PPP should do well, with the PML (N) following closely. To achieve the common purpose of trying to rectify what Musharraf had done with the country and the Constitution since his coup in 1999, these two parties would have to enter into a coalition.
The PPP may be running on a sympathy wave. It is a cadre based party, but also loyal to the Bhutto family in Pakistan’s feudal culture. But Benazir’s widower, Asif Zardari suddenly revealing his hidden ambition to become the Prime Minister when the party had basically projected Makhdom Amin Fahim as the party’s Prime Ministerial candidate, has shocked party members. Zardari has been trying to make amends. The election is, however, too near to be seriously divided over Zardari, but post elections, it stands to become a major issue to trouble the politics of the country. The old suspicion about Zardari’s ethics may be returning.
The question is whether the radicals themselves are interested in disturbing the elections, or are some of the smaller radical leaders being guided by another force? The Pakistan intelligence agency, the ISI, has its own interest to see that the main opposition parties do not win. The ISI is known to have strong links with some of these radicals.
With very little poll campaigning and threat to life, the voter turn out could be small. The smaller the turn our the easier would it be to rig the voting.
Historically, rigging has been the final arbiter in Pakistan’s elections. The common people did not care much, and went about their lives. Businessmen subtly changed sides. And the army either ruled from the chair or from behind. President Pervez Musharraf is responsible for changing this happy cohabitation.
The people want Musharraf out, and he desperately wants to stay in power. So do his acolytes and enforcees who are equally culpable. A bad drubbing at the polls portends a rather grim failure for Musharraf and his team.
In spite of pressures from his western allies to hold at least a reasonably fair election, Musharraf is very likely to avail of all tools at his disposal to have the PPP-PML (N) broad band defeated. He knows that nothing succeeds like success, and is prepared to deal with accusations after he wins.
A group of 40 NGOs declared that the names of 1.5 million voters did not figure in the Election Commission’s final lists. Equally there were many names of false voters in these lists. This is only one part of the rigging that has been exposed. There will be much more to come on polling day and in the counting of votes.
The army’s role in the February 18 polls is still opaque, but may not be so in the next three or four days. Heavy army deployment across the country has already started to ensure security. This is a traditional ploy. If observers across the world expected Gen. Kayani’s withdrawal of army officers from most civilian posts indicated his estrangement from Musharraf, they would be mistaken. This move only corrected one of Musharraf’s unnecessary and unpopular policies. The armed forces stick together in their own basic interests.
As a footnote for the future, it may be unfair to leave out the civil society. The politicians and the army were together in suffocating the civil society activists who demanded accountability, transparency and probity. That may be slowly changing with the lawyers and judges defying physical attacks and his government. The media joined them and the public mood is slowly catching on. A time bomb may be growing.
All things considered, the election results, howsoever arrived at, is unlikely to throw up a clear result. Then the negotiations will start on who gets what at the end of it.
To conclude, Pakistan’s politics appears to have started moving towards a change. It does not matter how slowly. The only thing that matters is that the move towards a positive change has started. The fundamentalists and extremists will have to give way ultimately.
(The author is an eminent analyst with many years of experience. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)
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