US Bombing of Terrorist Camps
in Afghanistan
by B.Raman
Certain Basic Facts About Osama Alias Osman Bin
Laden
* Fought in Afghanistan
against the troops of the erstwhile USSR and the Najibullah Government
of Afghanistan between 1980 and 1990.
* Operated from Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf countries between 1990 and 1993.
* Was based in the Sudan
between 1993 and 1996.
* Moved over to Jalalabad on
May 18,1996, after the Sudanese authorities asked him to quit following
the publication by the "Time" magazine of the US (May 6,1996)
of an interview given by him from the Sudanese territory, which made it
impossible for the Sudanese authorities to continue to deny his presence
in their territory.
* The Burhanuddin Rabbani Government, then in
power in Kabul, agreed to give him asylum after all other Muslim
countries rejected his request for asylum. The Pakistan Government
allowed him to transit through its territory on condition that he would
not re-enter Pakistan from Afghanistan. After his arrival in
Afghanistan, Bin Laden constructed a well- fortified camp at Tora Bora
Agam in the Nangarhar province adjoining Pakistan.
* The Taliban took him under its
protection in September,1996, after its capture of Jalalabad.
He was moved to Kandahar, where the Amir of the
Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, lives, in July,1997, after reports in the
Pakistani Press that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US were planning a joint
operation with the collaboration of the Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI)
of Pakistan to capture him from his residence in Jalalabad and have him
flown to the US for interrogation. He has been provided armed guards by
the Taliban. In addition, he has been allowed to keep 150 of his Arab
volunteers as his body-guards in Kandahar. After settling down in the
Kandahar area, Bin Laden constructed another well-fortified base in
southern Khost. Since the Taliban did not allow him to receive his
overseas-based visitors at his residence in the Kandahar area, he used
to meet them at his camp in Southern Khost.
His Relations With The Taliban And The Islaimc
Groups of Pakistan
Excellent because :
* Of his assistance to the various Afghan
Mujahideen groups in their jihad against Soviet and the Najibullah
Government troops. He is a hero figure to them.
* Of his objective of fighting for the
withdrawal of the US and other Western troops from Saudi Arabia, which
appeals to orthodox Islamic elements which look upon the presence of
these troops in Saudi territory as a desecration of the Muslim holy
places in Saudi Arabia.
* Of his liberal financial assistance
not only to the Taliban, but also to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly
known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar) and the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad and its
militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba of Pakistan.
* Of his marriage to a Pushtoon woman of
Pakistan and the marriage of his 18-year-old daughter from this woman to
the Amir of the Taliban. Thus, Bin Laden is the father-in-law of the
Amir.
* Of his assistance to the Taliban in
the recent capture of Mazar-e-Sharif and Bamiyan by Taliban troops. Bin
Laden and his Arab volunteers were in the vanguard of the attacks on
these towns.
There have been unsubstantiated reports of
differences among the Taliban leaders over the support given by Mullah
Omar to Bin Laden. According to Ismail Khan, the Peshawar correspondent of
the "News" ( August 20,1998), Mullah Rabbani, head of the
interim council ruling the Taliban-controlled territory from Kabul, and
Mullah Hassan, Governor of Kandahar, have been unhappy over the activities
of Bin Laden from the Afghan territory. But, they have not been able to do
anything about it because of the strong backing for Bin Laden from the
Taliban Amir.
Taliban's Attitude to his Activities From Afghan
Territory
Openly one of disapproval of any statements or
violent activities directed against the US and Saudi Arabia, but covertly
one of tolerance so long as the activities are deniable. Like the Sudan
before 1996, the Taliban has been unhappy over his penchant for seeking
publicity to his activities through the media. The Taliban is reported to
have strongly pulled him up following the press conference held by him at
Khost on May, 26,1998, at which he announced the formation of an
International Islamic Front For Jihad Against the US and Israel and the
telephone interview given by Dr.Aiman al-Zawahiri of the Jamatul Jihad of
Egypt, who lives with Bin Laden, to the "Frontier Post" of
Peshawar, on behalf of Bin Laden immediately before and after the US
bombings of the terrorist camps in Afghanistan on August 20,1998, uttering
threats against the US. He has been silent since then. There have been
unconfirmed reports that the Taliban has seized his satellite telephone
and Fax instrument after the US bombings.
The Islamic Front for Jihad Against The US &
Israel
The following groups are believed to have joined
his Front:
* The Jamatul Jihad of Egypt led by
Dr.al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden understands English, but cannot speak
fluently. Dr.al-Zawahiri, who speaks English without difficulty,
therefore, acts as his spokesman.
* Another Egyptian group led by Abu Asim
("kuniyat" or assumed name and not real name),a son of Sheikh
Omer Abdur Rehman, the blind Egyptian cleric, who is undergoing
imprisonment in the US for his involvement in the bombing of the World
Trade Centre in New York in February,1993. Two other sons of the Sheikh
are also living in the Kandahar area.
* A third Egyptian group led by Shawqi
Islam Bolo, brother of Khalid Islam Bolo, one of the assassins
of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt.
* The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen of Pakistan
and its two splinter groups.
* The Markaz Dawa Al Irshad of Pakistan
and its militant wing the Lashkar-e-Toiba.
* The Sipah-e-Sahaba of Pakistan,
an extremist Sunni organisation , which has been campaigning for the
proclamation of Pakistan as a Sunni State and is believed to be
responsible for the murder of a number of Shia leaders of Pakistan.
* The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami,
the organisation of Bin Laden, consisting exclusively of Arab volunteers
of Afghan war vintage. Most of them are Saudis and Yemenis with a small
spinkling of Egyptians, Sudanese and Palestinians from Jordan and the
Israeli-occupied territories.
* Groups from Tadjikistan, Xinjiang and
the Philippines, whose identities are not clear.
Bin Laden's Infrastructure in Afghanistan
What is described as Bin Laden’s terrorist
infrastructure in Afghanistan consists of the training camps of the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which had been in existence even before the arrival
of Bin Laden in Jalalabad in May,1996, the camps of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar,
the Afghan Mujahideen leader, which were taken over by the Taliban and
handed over to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen or Bin Laden and the camps set up
during the 1980s by Jalaluddin Haqqani, another Mujahideen leader, who has
since joined the Taliban.
Contrary to the claims of US officials, these
were not sophisticated training facilities, but improvised structures to
put up the trainees. The only sophisticated parts of these camps were the
ammunition storage depots, which were being used during the Afghan war of
the 1980s for storing the arms and ammunition given by the CIA before
their distribution to the Mujahideen by the ISI. Since CIA officials used
to visit these camps, set up with their assistance, during the 1980s, they
were well aware of their location and of the location of the ammunition
storage depots. It was, therefore , surprising that the American bombings
of August 20,1998, failed to hit any of the storage depots. They destroyed
only the improvised residential portions. This doesn’t speak well of the
much-vaunted Cruise missiles (Tomahawks).
The available details of the terrorist training
camps are as follows:
* The Harkat-ul-Jehad Al-Islami, Bin Laden’s
organisation, runs two camps called Badr I and Badr II— in the
vicinity of Khost.
* The camp of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen of Pakistan
at which Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Filippinos, Bosnian Muslims, Uighurs
from Xinjiang etc were being trained. It was run by one Maulvi Jabbar,
an ISI-trained cadre of the Harkatul-Mujahideen. This camp called the
Salman Farsi camp is located at Jawah, a couple of kms from the
Pakistani border post of Saidgai.
* This camp was started in 1989 by the Hizbul
Mujahideen of Jammu & Kashmir with the assistance of the
Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan for training Kashmiri extremists and
Pakistanis. After the Taliban’s relations with the Jamaat-e-Islami
deteriorated due to the latter’s support to Gulbuddin Heckmatyar, the
Taliban ordered the Hizbul Mujahideen to quit the camp and handed it
over to the Harkatul Ansar, as the Harkatul Mujahideen was then known.
After the US declared the Harkatul Ansar a terrorist organisation in
1997, it changed its name as Harkatul Mujahideen and that of the camp as
Hazrat Amir Mawia camp after one of the companions of the Holy Prophet.
The Harkatul Mujahideen runs two other camps. One of them located near
Zhavar is called the Khalid Bin Waleed camp and the other (name not
known) is located near the Darwanta power station, close to Jalalabad.
* The camp of the Jamiatul Mujahideen, a splinter
group of the Harkatul Mujahideen. It was being used exclusively for
training Pakistanis and Kashmiris. It was being run by one Mufti Bashir,
a resident of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). The name of the camp is
not known.
* The camp of another splinter group of the
Harkatul Mujahideen at Liza near Tanai. It was being run by Qari Saiful
Islam Akhtar, another ISI-trained cadre of the Harkatul Mujahideen.
The Liza camp is located about 40 kms from the
camps of the main Harkatul Mujahideen and the Jamiatul Mujahideen, which,
in turn, are located about 5 to 20 kms from the exclusively Arab camps of
Bin Laden.
Damages Inflicted by The US Bombings
There are conflicting accounts of the damages
inflicted by the US bombings. To summarise these accounts:
* Rahimullah Yusufzai:
A Peshawar-based correspondent of the "News", who was one of
the few journalists invited by Bin Laden for the May 26 press conference
at Khost and who had visited the site of all the camps after the US
bombings ("News" of September 6): There were only about 25
inmates in the Al Badr complex at the time of the bombing. Six of them
were killed. According to some people, all of them were Arabs, whereas,
according to others, four only were Arabs while the remaining two were
Tadjiks. About a dozen Cruise missiles hit the Arab camps destroying two
residential hutments and three mosques.The only cemented building in the
Al Badr complex in which Bin Laden had held his May press conference was
not hit. Most of the buildings and ammunition storage depots of the
Harkatul Mujahideen camps were also not hit. Only seven or eight
residential hutments were destroyed.
* Jalaluddin Haqqani:
None of the ammunition depots of either Bin Laden’s organisation or
the Harkatul Mujahideen and its splinter groups was hit by the US
missiles. The Salman Farsi camp emerged largely unscathed and the Al-Badr
camps suffered minimal damage. Only the Khalid Bin Waleed and the Hazrat
Amir Mawia camps suffered substantial damage. ("News" of
September 4,1998)
* Fazlur Rahman Khalili:
The leader of the Harkatul Mujahideen: While the Arab camps in the Al
Badr area came out almost unscathed, those of the Harkatul Mujahideen
suffered damages, resulting in the death of nine members, including Abu
Huraira (not real name), a well-known instructor. Four mosques were
completely destroyed, while a fifth escaped with minor damages.
(‘News" of August 26,1998)
Reasons for the Inadequate Success of The US
Bombings
Amongst the important reasons were:
* Poor intelligence
Bin Laden and most of the inmates of the camps had gone to
Mazar-e-Sharif in the beginning of August to assist the Taliban in the
capture of the city. From there, they had gone to Bamiyan. They had not
yet returned to their camps till August 20,1998.Hence, the only inmates
of the camps were the administrative staff and those who could not go to
Mazar-e-Sharif due to illness. The US claim that Bin Laden was to attend
a dinner at one of the camps on the night of August,20,1998, was,
therefore, not correct.
* Absence of the surprise element
Ever since July,1997, the Pakistani press had been speculating about a
possible special operation by the CIA and FBI, with the co-operation of
the ISI, to kidnap Bin Laden from the Kandahar area.. After the
withdrawal of non-essential American personnel from Pakistan on August
18,1998, most of the Pakistani newspapers ( "Dawn" of August
20, "Nation", "News", "Muslim" and
‘Pakistan Observer", all of August 19,1998) had speculated about
the imminence of an US operation against Bin Laden. The speculation
focussed on the possibility of a helicopter-borne operation to whisk him
out of Afghanistan after he had possibly been rendered unconscious
through the use of drugs or chemical gases. However, none of them had
anticipated a massive Cruise missile attack. The Taliban and the
followers of Bin Laden had time to remove whatever arms and ammunition
they had kept in the storage depots.
* The inaccuracy of the Cruise missiles
This seemed to have mostly hit non-essential structures, possibly due to
inaccurate target data fed into them.
Was The Pakistan Government Privy to The
Bombings?
If the Pakistan Government was not privy, two
dangers could have arisen:
* A possible panic reaction by the Pakistani
authorities under the mistaken impression that the missiles had been
fired by India.
* An accidental impact of the low-flying
missiles with aircraft while they were in the process of taking-off or
landing.
The Pakistani authorities have stated that while
they were aware of the presence of US naval ships and a submarine 200 kms
from the Pakistani coast, they were not aware of the purpose. According to
them, the first intimation about the US strike was given to Gen.Jehangir
Karamat, the then Army Chief, by Gen.Joseph Ralston, Vice-Chairman of the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a transit halt at Islamabad airport,
after the Cruise missiles had been launched and were on their way to the
targets. Gen.Ralston himself told the "Wall Street Journal" on
August 24 that he was sent to Pakistan to ensure that the launch of the
missiles did not inadvertently start a war between India and Pakistan. He
met the Pakistani officers "while the Cruise missiles were flying
over their country". He added: "I didn’t in any way tell the
Pakistanis what was going on until after the attack."
Critics of Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz
Sharif, have alleged that Pakistan was privy to the bombings much before
the Cruise missiles were launched and had secretly instructed all airport
authorities to delay take-offs and landings of aircraft during the
relevant period.
Likely Consequences of The Bombings
A) Other Islamic countries, which were
even earlier reluctant to grant sanctuary or transit facilities to Bin
Laden, would be even more hesitant in future lest they invite
retaliation by the US.
B) Would strengthen the hands of those
elements in the Taliban leadership which have been unhappy over Bin
Laden’s anti-US and anti-Saudi activities from Afghan territory. The
Taliban would exercise greater control over his activities.
C) This would not, however, reduce US
vulnerability to terrorist attacks from Arab mercenaries of Afghan war
vintage and other Muslim extremists. As against about 300 Arab
mercenaries present with Bin Laden in Afghanistan, there is an equal
number floating around in the world in autonomous groups. While they too
are admirers of Bin Laden, they do not necessarily accept his
leadership. They have their own grounds for grievances against the US.
They are unlikely to be deterred by the US bombings.
Implications for India:
The implications for India from the activities of
Bin Laden are more indirect through his surrogates like the Harkatul
Mujahideen, the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba than direct.
During his press conference of May 26,1998, at Khost, Bin Laden had
reportedly stated that while he would have liked to participate in the
Jihad in Kashmir, the Pakistani authorities would not allow him to do so.
This is most probably true. Bin Laden is the most wanted terrorist in the
US today and, by assisting or using him in any way, Pakistan would run the
risk of once again being put on the so-called watch list of State-sponsors
of international terrorism as it was put for six months in 1993 by the
Clinton Administration. 3-11-1998
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute
For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com
)
