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Note no. 461
28-July-2008
Sri Lanka: Some Thoughts on LTTE's Military Response - Update No 147
By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
[This is the second part of SAAG Note No 458 "Sri Lanka: War after the fall of Vidattalthivu- Part 1–Update No146" dated July 21, 2008 available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes5/note458.html]
During the last one week, Sri Lanka army has kept up its momentum of advance. According to defence sources, the troops of 57 Division are on the periphery of line Tunukkai-Mallavi, west of A9 highway. We can expect them to secure the line from Vellankulam on the coast to Mallavi during the course of the week The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s failed attempt to dislodge the security forces in area South of Vavunikulam tank by last Wednesday is significant. Vavunikulam is astride the Vellankulam-Mallavi-Mankulam road axis and provides a take off point to build up the threat to Mankulam on A9. Even if the LTTE had succeeded, at best it would have bought a few more days of respite. However, the fact is that the LTTE was beaten back at Vavunikulam with a body count of 29 LTTE dead.
The LTTE counter attack probably did not have either the force levels required to stall the advancing troops or the fire power to unnerve them. The overwhelming size of the security forces offensive has cast the odds heavily against the LTTE. By present reckoning the LTTE at present can respond only fight defensive battles to save its shrinking territorial assets rather than mount a forceful offensive.
The LTTE has to halt the troops in their tracks in a series of delaying actions, or build a major offensive to cut the advancing military's long line of communication at a place of its choosing. So can the LTTE do it? And if so, where will it do? These are questions which Sri Lankan operational planners must be looking at. It seems from the Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka's statement that he expects the LTTE leaders to be huddled in their Vanni bunkers in a bid to save themselves when the LTTE Heroes Day comes in November 2008. He probably implied that the security forces would secure the territory west of A9 road by then. The build up of a three-division offensive on a broad front extending the whole of Mullaitivu district from Vellankulam on the west to Welioya on the east could aim at making a sweep from west to east to make the line Pooneryn-Kilinochchi untenable for the LTTE to hold in the coming month. However this military conjecture is only one of wide options open to the security forces now.
The LTTE appears to be responding in the way it knows best. Strategically, make a play internationally with an eye on drawing the overseas Tamil support, kindle Tamil Nadu's latent sympathetic embers, and step up killings and mayhem around Colombo and the heartlands of Sri Lanka. On the tactical front its actions are hazy and uncertain.
The LTTE's damatic announcement on July 21 to "observe a unilateral ceasefire that is devoid of military actions during the period of the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] conference from 26th July to 4th August and give our cooperation for the success of the conference" is undoubtedly part of this strategy to buy time and aspire for a sympathetic audience when international attention focuses on the 15th SAARC summit conference is held in Colombo.
Apparently the LTTE gesture was laudable and would be welcomed by the people of Vanni who have been suffering immensely in the conflict. Tactically it would be unacceptable to the security forces when their offensive had made substantial progress and pose a real threat to the LTTE stronghold at Pooneryn/ Kilinochchi in the near future. A ceasefire even for 10 days would break the momentum of Sri Lankan advance. That would provide a vital breathing space for the LTTE forces now under tremendous pressure to recuperate their losses, tighten up defences and be prepared to respond to the security forces better. So it came as no surprise that the Sri Lanka government rejected the LTTE's unilateral ceasefire announcement.
In any case past experience of the LTTE misusing such ceasefire periods does not endear anyone fighting it to accept such offers. (Even Indian army experience of such 'LTTE ceasefire' was similar). When the LTTE was fighting the earlier episode of the Eelam War, it declared one such unilateral ceasefire on December 24, 2000 that continued up to April 2001. Even then the Sri Lanka government was cautious in its response, despite international efforts to initiate mediation. Barely three months later, in July 2001 came the daring LTTE Black Tiger raid on Katunayake airport crippling the civilian airlines and destroying substantial air force assets shocking the whole nation. Armies the world over go by lessons of war learned with their own blood and sweat. And Sri Lanka is no exception.
As far as the international audience is concerned, the number of ears sympathetic to the LTTE is dwindling. The global attitude to terrorism has changed. For all intents and purposes many nations consider the LTTE a terrorist organisation regardless of semantic arguments. Its international credibility is perhaps at the lowest now thanks to the nerve wracking experience of nations in handling terrorists of various kinds. Even those nations that do not call or consider the LTTE a terrorist body are cautious about coming out in support of the LTTE as they used to do in the 90s. So in reality the LTTE probably had no great expectations of any positive international response to its announcement.
The LTTE's strategic campaign among expatriates works best on an audience prone to be sympathetic to its cause. To augment its support base the LTTE will have to win over those who respond to the cause of Tamil autonomy but find the LTTE style of working abhorrent. This is what the LTTE is attempting among the Tamil expatriates at the large Pongu Thamizh public gatherings marshalled in key European capitals with strategically positioned LTTE flags and Prabhakaran portraits to catch the visual media. To make this strategy work the LTTE will have to do more than use its muscle power it had exercised among the expatriates all these years.
The LTTE's autocratic style has limited political appeal for expatriates who are enjoying the fruits freedom in democratic societies where they live. However, all these years they were impressed with its innovative conventional and unconventional operational skill. However, that fundamental military credibility on which the LTTE's reputation is built has now been shaken in the Eelam War-4. So the LTTE has to prove its military muscle in the war; and so far this is being weakened further with every success of the security
forces.
The best option for the LTTE is to look for an external power to bale it out of the war mess. In the past India, which has been sympathetic to the cause of Sri Lanka Tamil autonomy, did intervene in their favour till the LTTE shot itself in the foot when its assassin exploded the suicide bomb to kill Rajiv Gandhi. There were reports of India planning to induct substantial strength of Indian forces for the security of its Prime Minister during the SAARC conference. Immediately, the anti Indian lobby in Sri Lanka became vocal in their objection. Though the LTTE did not do so, it must have been really worried because Indian military intrevention for whatever apparent reason was the last thing it would like. So the LTTE's unilateral ceasefire announcement was also probably prompted by this desire ease India's apprehensions.
The ceasefire was also timed to coincide with the increasing incidents of Indian fishermen coming under the attack of Sri Lanka navy reported in Tamil Nadu. Such reports are stirring up the sentiments of Tamil population in India. When public sentiments are roused the technicalities of Tamil Nadu fishermen poaching in Sri Lanka waters or smuggling essential goods for the LTTE in the war zone are not considered germane to the larger interests of Tamils. So the LTTE stands to gain as long as this issue is on the boil. And as the battle progresses, we can expect the LTTE to offer more incentives for Tamil Nadu fishermen to lure them to smuggle supplies vital to survive and fight. With the security forces dominating the Mannar coast more and more such efforts could spark more flashpoints of attack on fishermen. How the Tamil Nadu government responds to such incidents is going to become crucial in the coming weeks.
The Tamil Nadu chief minister M Karunanidhi extended the whole hearted support of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) to the ruling coalition in Delhi when the recent vote of confidence for the Manmohan Singh government came up in Indian parliament. Having proved his credentials as a dependable ally, with the parliamentary polls coming up after four months the DMK leader can be expected to retain his strong links with the Congress party to fight his bệte noire Miss J Jayalalitha of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK). As the elections get closer, he will have to reiterate his credentials as a leader of the Tamils sympathetic to Sri Lanka Tamil cause. So the LTTE will have a difficult task to do the extra mile to enrol even his covert support unless it looks like the winning side in the war.
So the LTTE's war is looking loaded against it both strategically, and tactically. Can Prabhakaran pull the rabbit out of his hat to turn the war? And it is a tough take for anyone because that is a 64 dollar question.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
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